Instead he had run into a trap, and had faced a triple defeat -- in Kharkov, in the Crimea, and in Leningrad -- that allowed the Germans to attack again, this time across the great plains of southern Russia" (115).
Following the defeat of the Germans at the hands of the Russians, though, the Soviet army planned its counterattack but the same enormous land mass that adversely affected Hitler's ability to successfully prosecute a long war against Soviet Russia also affected the Russians' efforts to invade Germany because of the enormous land mass involved in the process. As Beevor emphasizes, "Even as the German army was clearly on the run, the Soviets feared it. German soldiers remained formidable to the end, and as the Ardennes offensive had shown, they were quite capable of pulling surprises" (114).
Indeed, there was legitimate cause for concern on the part of the Russians because...
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