Terrorism

How have worries over WMD terror attacks distorted a balanced approach to policy on terrorism?

Intelligence failures led to the presumption that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (Jervis).[footnoteRef:1] The presumption was rooted in a widespread policy playing upon mortal fears, rather than on reason. "Although administration officials exaggerated the danger that Saddam posed, they also revealed their true fears when they talked about the possibility that he could use WMD against the United States or its allies," (Jervis, p. 57).[footnoteRef:2] It also "made little difference" that Saddam was shown to have no WMDs (Jervis, p. 57).[footnoteRef:3] Therefore, the approach to policy on terrorism has been overtly shaped by fear mongering rather than on intelligence. [1: Jervis, Robert, 2005.] [2: Jervis, Robert, 2005, p. 57] [3: Jervis, Robert, 2005, p. 57]

At the same time, policy on terrorism is always going to entail some type of trade-off between preparing...
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