Total Pages: 8 Words: 2459 Works Cited: 20 Citation Style: Harvard Document Type: Essay
Essay Instructions: Title: A critical evaluation of the RISK FACTORS relating to strategic decision making processes and strategic planning, with particular emphasis on Enterprise Risk, in the destination holiday resort Spa industry sector
NOTES to writer : (use generic service sector/tourism sector examples. The enterprise is a holiday resort based business, a service sector tourism business specialising in short break market with a destination spa on the resort, the enterprise is a business called Bluestone. A case study will follow the 4 sections to be drafted by writemyessay writer, the case study will be completed afterwards by me.)
The essay/report to define terms, discuss various theories and models as below:
Section 1 Business Risks - overview of the risk environment (DEFINE MAJOR STRATEGIC RISKS FOR BUSINESSESS what are they? generic theory, concepts and definitions, literature review, COMPARE CONTRAST
Section 2 The Need for Risk Management - and the effect of risk (generic, service/tourism/spa sector) include reducing exposure to unnecessary and un-factored risk which may include the context of reputation risk, social risk and environmental risk .
Section 3 Strategic Management approaches to risk and Process of Risk Management ? WHAT ARE THE APPOACHES WHAT IS THE PROCESS
Section 4 Enterprise Risk Management models and approaches - WITH RELEVANCE TO THIS INDUSTRY SECTOR. discussion can include:
ERM frameworks or models, which is the best one for using in this industry sector and why?
Describe how the ERM works within the internal and external environment facing the enterprise. Discuss that Management selects a risk response strategy for specific risks identified and analyzed, which may include:
1. Avoidance: exiting the activities giving rise to risk
2. Reduction: taking action to reduce the likelihood or impact related to the risk
3. alternative actions: deciding and considering other feasible steps to minimize risks.
4. Share or insure: transferring or sharing a portion of the risk, to finance it
5. Accept: no action is taken, due to a cost/benefit decision
Explain how monitoring is typically performed by management as part of its internal control activities, such as review of analytical reports or management committee meetings with relevant experts, to understand how the risk response strategy is working and whether the objectives are being achieved.
Fuller notes are attached and a Bluestone report about strategic planning and management is also attached for background. the outline essay/report plan has some text in italics. this is the case study that will be completed by me not the draft writer. the sections to be completed are accompanied by notes which can be adapted and used in the writers text.
Excerpt From Essay:
Essay Instructions: Referring to the fair value case write an essay about its Business Risk Assessment, Fraud triangle, COSO analysis (specifically referring to the case examples and in depth not the generalities)
The case is attached: fair value
and the other attachment is an example of an essay about enron covering the 3 topics.
Business risk assessment: 1) Nature of the entity, 2) Industry, regulatory, and other external factors, 3) objective, strategies and related business risk, 4) entity performance measures 5) internal control
Fraud Triangle- Opportunity, Incentive/Pressure, Attitude and Rationalization
COSO Framework- 1) Control Environment, 2) the entity info system and related business process relevant to financial reporting and communication, 3) Control activities, 4) Monitoring activities.
There are faxes for this order.
Excerpt From Essay:
Essay Instructions: Provide a three page, double-spaced, Times New Roman, 12 point summary of the article "Electronic Security Information Documentation" available below. The paper should include a referenced (footnotes or endnotes) analysis indicting agreement or disagreement with the author. It is important that that you use references to back up some of your statements.
Electronic Information Security Documentation
Peggy Fung1 , Lam-for Kwok1, Dennis Longley2
1 Department of Computer Science
City University Of Hong Kong
Kowloon, Hong Kong
2 Information Security Research Centre
Queensland University of Technology
firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org
Effective security management depends upon good risk
management, which is itself based upon a reliable risk
assessment, involving data collection of all the facets
influencing system risk. Such data collection is often an
extremely onerous task, particularly if a substantial proportion
of the required information is not adequately documented.
Hence comprehensive, updated information security
documentation is a keystone of good information security
management. Whilst the recently emerging information security
management standards provide some implicit guidance on the
development of documentation; there is relatively little support
available for security officers attempting to develop and
maintain such documentation.
Traditionally textual security documents are not necessarily the
most appropriate format for describing the security of large
complex, networked systems, subject to frequent updates. It has
been suggested ,  that a security officer?s workstation,
with a database and GUIs, may present a more effective form of
security documentation. However, such a tool requires a welldeveloped
model of the information system and, as discussed in
this paper, a standardised means of representing security
This paper proposes an information security model to facilitate
the development of electronic security documentation. A
proposed security entity classification scheme is first described.
Such a classification scheme and the use of object identifiers to
identify security entities greatly facilitates the development of a
security officer?s workstation. The potential of the model for
risk assessment and security design is described.
A prototype model was developed in Visual Basic to test the
concepts proposed, and a Java based model is currently under
development at the City University of Hong Kong..
Keywords: Information Security Management, Risk Analysis,
Information Security Standards, Information Security
In the past three decades there has been a sharp increase
in the awareness of the potential deleterious impacts,
arising from inadequate information security.
Copyright ? 2003, Australian Computer Society, Inc. This
paper appeared at the Australasian Information Security
Workshop 2003 (AISW2003), Adelaide, Australia. Conferences
in Research and Practice in Information Technology, Vol. 21. C.
Johnson, P. Montague and C. Steketee, Eds. Reproduction for
academic, not-for profit purposes permitted provided this text is
Unfortunately the scale of the problem has escalated more
rapidly than the commitment to combat it. Moreover, in
many cases, the media emphasis on hackers and viruses
has distorted the debate and tended to divert senior
management awareness from the more fundamental
aspects of information security.
In particular there may be a sharper focus on technical
solutions, to well advertised attacks, than on the
fundamental necessity to view information security as an
organisation wide business/ management / technology
Organisational security officers are charged with ensuring
the security of information assets and systems. As such,
they are perilously located between management and
technology. They are required to ensure that the
technological systems are implemented and operated in
such a manner, that the business risk to organisational
information assets and systems is contained within
acceptable boundaries. In effect they are required to
assess the level of business risk from an information
security viewpoint, and to recommend operational or
technical changes designed to bring that risk down to
some acceptable, but often unspecified, level.
The first step in such a risk assessment involves a major
data collection and evaluation process. This process is
often extremely time consuming, disruptive and
expensive. Hence, there is a temptation to work with
over-simplified models of the information system, and to
request highly subjective estimates of risk-related data
from I.T. staff.
Subjective risk assessments bode ill for a security officer
in a highly complex, networked environment, particularly
when information security failures may have significant
impacts on the financial well being or the regulatory or
contractual obligations of that organisation. In the
aftermath of a serious information security failure,
security officers may well be called upon to supply
convincing, documented, evidence that their risk
assessment recommendations, to senior management,
were well founded.
Hence one can easily demonstrate the importance of
comprehensive, timely, risk and security documentation,
to organisational security officers. Unfortunately, there
appears to be minimal support systems available to
security officers tasked with the development,
maintenance and interpretation of such documentation.
Information security management standards such as
German IT Baseline Protection Manual Standard Security
Safeguards , BS7799 , and ISO17799  do provide
an infrastructure of information security management and
hence some guidance on the structure of security
documentation. Nevertheless it is interesting to compare
the emphasis on bookkeeping in the training of financial
auditors, with the average educational/training courses for
security personnel. In general there is a significant lack of
guidance, let alone tools to aid the security officer in the
In this paper, we discuss the importance and role of
information security documentation. In particular it is
suggested that a commonly agreed information security
model, and a common method of security entity
classification, would facilitate the development of
software tools for the production and utilisation of such
2 Role of Information Security Documentation
2.1 Support for Risk Assessment
The information security industry has made significant
advances to meet the perceived threats to organisational
information security. Originally, outside the military
sector, the major threat identified by the finance and
banking industry was the security of electronic
transactions, and security manufacturers supplied
hardware cryptographic systems to this market. The
advent of viruses in the late 1980s spurred a new industry
in anti-viral software. Later the development of the
Internet as a common communication channel for
organisations, expanded the hacker community and the
production of firewalls to thwart them. PKI companies
provided cryptographic software the emerging Ecommerce
market, and many organisations now invest in
various access tokens such as smart and magnetic stripe
cards. The biotechnology industry is also continually
gearing itself up for its promised future.
Nevertheless security officers can face a difficult task, in
convincing management that these vendor products
represent only a part of the solution. Individual
countermeasures must be embedded within a coherent
information security infrastructure, if the organisational
operations are to be adequately protected.
The development of such an infrastructure must itself be
guided by effective risk assessment projects. The
importance of effective risk analysis was recognised in
the early 1970s, and there was a strong move by some
governments to facilitate the adoption of such
methodologies in sensitive computing systems.
Risk analysis includes the identification of assets, threats,
vulnerabilities, countermeasures and the evaluation of
loss expectancy. An information security risk analysis
study defines the IT environment under consideration and
recommends corrective actions.
Risk analysis projects were relatively expensive, even in
the mainframe computing era, because they involve the
collection and evaluation of a significant volume of data
including: ? the intrinsic threats, the IT system, its
physical and operating environment, the assets to be
protected and the business functions dependent on those
Such risk studies were either conducted by in-house staff
or external consultants. In general the in-house staff often
lacked extensive experience of the subjective aspects of
risk evaluation, and consultants had no previous
knowledge or experience of the organisational system
under study. Generally the existing documentation was
inadequate, in terms of its content, detail and currency,
for risk assessment. Hence the initial familiarisation
process was normally accompanied with a major task of
The magnitude of this initial familiarisation task escalated
rapidly, as systems evolved from batch processing
mainframes to current complex, multi site networked,
client server scenarios. Moreover, the batch processing
mainframe environment was stable for long periods,
usually between purchases of the mainframe equipment.
Hence risk assessment recommendations had a long halflife,
significantly reducing the average annual cost of
In the current climate the complexity and volatility of
information systems is such that:
The risk assessors, must at the outset, have
significant knowledge of the organisational system,
its environment and the business functions that it
The system documentation must be sufficiently
versatile, comprehensive and timely to reduce the
data collection task to achievable levels.
The cost of risk assessment updates must be
There appear to be two conclusions from the above:
IT systems must be fully documented, from a
security viewpoint, and such documentation must be
The abovementioned security documentation must
be in a format that significantly reduces the cost and
effort of risk assessment exercises.
2.2 Due Diligence
The evolution of IT systems, described above, clearly
escalated the magnitude and complexity of the
organisational security officer?s task. This development
in IT systems was moreover accompanied by increasing
integration of the IT systems into the organisational
business functions, to the extent that the health of the
business functions were inextricably linked to that of the
supporting computing and computing systems.
Computing downtimes, causing merely minor irritation in
the erstwhile mainframe era, would be life threatening to
most modern corporations.
Hence the security officer is not only faced with a major
task of risk assessment in a complex environment, the
potential penalties associated with inadequacies, in the
subsequent recommendations, have also escalated.
Unfortunately given the probabilistic nature of risk
assessment, there can be never be a guarantee of incident
free operation for the IT system over a long period of
In a post security incident environment the security
officer must demonstrate that the security systems
implemented were reasonably compatible with the true
level and nature of the system risk. Moreover, current I.T
system failures may have serious consequences for the
financial well being of the organisation, and for its
compliance with regulatory and contractual obligations.
In the current climate management may well be formally
required to demonstrate due diligence in the protection of
information assets and systems.
Macro risk assessments, based upon apocryphal,
subjective assessments, are likely to be unconvincing in
the witness stand. Today?s security officers would be well
advised to equip themselves with comprehensive security
documentation, and associated risk assessment strategies,
as evidence that they had acted with a high level of
2.3 Security Documentation Requirements
It is much easier to make a case for the development of
comprehensive security documentation, that to actually
produce the documentation itself. In many cases advice
takes the form ? I would not start from here?.
The information security management standards do
provide an infrastructure for information security
management, which at least suggests a structure for the
documentation. A recent paper by the authors 
suggested the type of current organisational
documentation and data that should be collected and
packaged to form an initial set of information security
In this paper the necessary facets of security
documentation are described and some insight into recent
work on an Information Security Model is discussed.
At the outset the question arises ? what is being described
by the security documentation? Most system
documentation is designed to assist operators and
developers in the performance of their tasks. Security
documentation is not however aimed normal system
operation, but rather at the circumstances in which the
system fails, in some sense. Hence security
documentation should provide a detailed description of an
agreed security model for the system. In other words an
organisation?s security documentation should contain the
local parameters of a generally accepted information
The proposed model need not be described in
conventional textual format. Given the complexity,
magnitude and volatility of modern information systems,
some form of database representation is more appropriate.
Moreover such a database should be supported with
software tools and GUIs to facilitate the development,
updating, investigation, risk analysis and security
If a common model were employed by organisations then
third party vendors would be encouraged develop support
software. Moreover, given a common format of security
documentation one could envisage situations in which
external security advice and expertise were readily
absorbed by an organisation. Hence it is possible to
envisage a system in which CERT Advisories are
automatically downloaded and added to the security
database. The security software could then generate a
report on the implications of the reported attack for the
3 A Proposed Model
The Risk Data Repository ,  is a risk analysis model,
developed some years ago, which aimed to integrate all
available organisational data related to security. The
model had the ability to evolve over time as it
incorporated newly acquired data. The RDR described
entities in term of their roles from a security viewpoint,
and demonstrated the inter-relationships of security data.
The RDR essentially comprised three domains:
Environment, Platforms and Assets. The environment
domain included elements that effectively hosted or
supported the operation of the information processing
system: equipment, building, staff. The platform domain
was the logical description of the information processing
system and its defences. The assets domain described the
data and processes, to be protected, because misuse of
these assets would have a deleterious effect on the
organisational business operations.
The RDR comprised a database and graphical facilities to
trace the inter-relationship of security entities. Hence it
was possible to trace the effect of a threat of fire in a
building to the potential business impact. Experience with
the RDR demonstrated three significant aspects of such
the difficulty of describing the wide range of security
entities concerned with risk assessment and security
problems of importing data from other RDRs; and
problems arising from the hard coding of security
expertise in the model.
It was clear that a major problem in the development of
such an organisational risk database lay with the
classification of the various entities. There appears to be
no common directory to describe such items as: Threats,
Computing Hardware, Buildings, Services, Users,
Information Assets, Access Control Policies, etc.
In the development of an Information Security Model, to
replace the RDR, the concept of Environment, Platform
and Assets was extended to five categories:
Systems: includes hardware, software, platforms,
networks, applications, users and information assets.
Environment: includes locations (sites, buildings,
floors and rooms) and services (power, cabling, air
conditioning, water and communications).
Security: includes threats, countermeasures, Threat
Trees and Threat Countermeasure Diagrams.
Procedure: includes external procedures, such as
government legislation and international standards,
and internal procedures: organization policies,
Relationships: security depends critically upon the
context of entities and this context is described by
relationships. For example, hardware is located in a
building, networks are connected to other networks,
and a security policy complies with a Standard?s
recommendation. Relationships among the various
entities are defined here.
Each of the above classes has a number of subclasses and
the whole set of entities can be described as a directory
tree. Borrowing the concepts of X.500 the various
subclasses and subsequent entities can be classified with
object identifiers, representing the set of nodes traversed
from the root to that entity (See Fig 1).
The proposed classification system has a number of
immediate advantages, from a risk assessment and
security documentation viewpoint. Firstly each entity is
uniquely and succinctly identified by its object identifier,
indicating its position in the directory tree.
Secondly the classification provides a top down model
with the major entities specified at an early stage of
development. For example, a building, floor and room are
each subclasses of the parent - site. It is well recognised in
risk assessment that the preliminary investigation involves
consideration of the major entities, followed by a
subsequent refinement into more detailed areas, as the
analysis identifies the risk priorities. Risk assessment
models that require full system details to be entered at the
outset hit major data collection problems.
The top down approach is also facilitated by the
Platforms entities under Systems entities. Platforms are
large IT systems comprising all the other Systems entities,
Hardware, Software, Networks, Users and Assets.
Defining Platforms at an early stage facilitates a largescale
organizational model, e.g. Platforms, located on
A further advantage of the classification scheme is that it
facilitates the importation of data from another risk
database, assuming both databases have followed the
same classification model. Hence mergers within
branches of an organization, with consequent integration
of systems, can be readily handled, from a risk assessment
/ security documentation viewpoint.
The classification system described so far provides only
an inventory of the security entities. Security relevant
details of those entities, e.g. vulnerability to flooding for a
site, communication protocol of a network, issue date of a
security manual, are also stored in the database. Given the
diverse nature of the entities such attribute information is
stored as a
Risk assessment and security documentation are,
essentially concerned with the relationships between these
entities, i.e. the Web Server is Located in the IT Building,
and there be will a wide diversity of such linkages. Given
the importance of these linkages, to the role of the model,
they are themselves classified as security entities i.e.
Relationships. Hence the linkages, or relationships can be
structured into classes and sub-classes, with each class
and sub class given an object identifier. Such linkages can
be stored as a simple tuple: < Linkage OI, Incident Entity
OI, Target Entity OI>, represents a linkage between two
entities, similarly linkages involving three or more entities
can be unambiguously defined.
For example, the relationship
Server A is located in Building B can be represented by
the tuple <22.214.171.124.1.3, 126.96.36.199.2, 188.8.131.52>. Where
5.1 Relationships between two entities
5.1.1 incident entity is a Systems (1)
184.108.40.206 target entity is an Environment (2)
220.127.116.11.1 relationship class is
Environment/Locations (ID = 1)
18.104.22.168.1.3 particular Location Link (ID = 3).
1.1.1 Computing Hardware (ID = 1)
22.214.171.124 Server Class (ID = 3)
126.96.36.199.2 Server A (ID = 2).
2.1.3 HQ Site (ID = 3)
188.8.131.52 Building B (ID = 2).
The model entities, attributes and relationships can
provide an overview of the current systems, e.g. major
platforms, the major components of such platforms:
networks, computing systems, users, information assets,
the sites where the platforms are located, the services they
Fig 1. Directory Tree For Security Entities
Systems(1) Environment(2 Security(3) Procedures(4)Relationships(5)
Fig 2.Effect Of Intrinsic Threat On Business Operation
CAUSING FINANCIAL LOSS TO
CAUSING DAMAGE TO
depend upon etc. The model can also be refined with
increasing level of detail, e.g. the sub-networks that form
the major networks etc.
The relationships can be employed to facilitate crossreferences
between documentation. For example, the
Procedures Class can refer both to internal and external
documentation. Hence chapter and paragraphs of
standards, and security manuals may be given object
identifiers. A Compliance relationship, between
paragraphs in internal security manuals and corresponding
paragraphs in BS 7799, would facilitate internal audits.
3.2 Threat Trees
Risk Assessment is concerned with the ultimate effect of
intrinsic threats, e.g. fire, loss of external services,
international network failures, on business operations
(See Fig 2). An important role of the security
documentation, and hence the proposed model is to
facilitate the tracing of such threat scenarios.
From the work on the model conducted so far, it would
appear that the classification scheme, and in particular the
classification of relationships, significantly facilitates
such threat tracing.
The threat transmission illustrated in Fig 2 is in effect a
series of statements along the following lines:
Incident Threat acting on Incident Entity causes Target
Threat to act upon Target Entity (Fig 3). For example:
Fire acting upon Building causing Physical Damage
to Equipment (located in Building).
Threats are security entities classified in the model and
are classified within the Security class. The concept of a
Threat acting upon an Entity is embodied in a
Threat_Entity relationship i.e. the tuple
The Risk Assessment diagram (Fig 2) may hence be
represented as a Threat Tree (Fig 4) where each node
represents a Threat_Entity relationship caused by the
parent Threat_Entity. Relationship. The Threat Tree
recognises that a Threat_Entity may spread to many target
entities. At this stage it should also be stated that the
Threat_Entity transmission need not be restricted to a
tree, since a Threat_Entity node can have more than one
parent. The model can deal with these situations but for
simplicity they are not discussed here.
The concept of threat trees is well known, but a major
problem with such trees lies in the effort required for their
development. One of the more interesting facets, of the
proposed model, is that it opens up the possibility of an
automatic construction of threat trees. Consider first
manual development of threat trees in the context of the
The starting point is the root node, i.e. interest is focused
upon the effect of a particular threat acting upon a
particular entity, or more simply upon a particular
At this stage some security expertise is required to predict
the effect of this Threat_Entity on other entities in the
organizational database. For example, a security officer
would predict that a fire in a room would damage
equipment in that room. In effect a Relationship between
Threat_Entities, which are themselves Relationships, is
developed. This Relationship between Threat_Entities is
termed a TETE in the model. Hence:
TETE defines the linking of the Threat_Entities <
TETE_1_OI, TE_1_OI, TE_2_OI>
Given a database of all possible Threat_Entities and
TETEs, developed by a security officer, then threat trees
could be automatically produced for any root
Threat_Entity as described below:
1. Starting with the root Threat_Entity, TE_1_OI,
check all TETE entries
2. Extract TE_c_OI from TETE_a_OI ? this is a
child node in the threat tree.
3. Repeat 1 ? 2 until no more TETEs found.
4. Repeat 1- 3 for the next child node in the threat
INCIDENT THREAT ACTING ON INCIDENT ENTITY
TARGET THREAT ACTING ON TARGET ENTITY
Fig 3. A Threat Entity Causes A Resultant Threat Entity
This procedure does provide for the automatic
development of threat trees, but at a massive cost of
manual development of possibly billions of TETEs. Some
results of the model, however, suggests that multiple
TETEs describing, for example, fires in every room in the
organization, and the equipment stored in each individual
room, can be replaced by a single TETE using object
identifiers with wild cards.
As a simple example of this approach consider the
observation that a fire in a building, with OI 2/1/1/1, is
could affect all floors of that building, and such floors can
be represented with wild card OIs 2/1/1/1/*. Hence we
can replace individual TETEs representing the spread to
each individual floor with a single TETE along the lines <
TETE_a_OI, TE_b_OI, TE-c_OI > where
TE_b_OI is < TE_b_OI, Threat_Fire_OI, 2/1/1/1 >
TE_c_OI is < TE_c_OI, Threat_Fire_OI, 2/1/1/1/* >
Using a comprehensive wild card approach security
expertise can be embodied in a minimal number of
TETEs, which can then be used to develop automatic
The work conducted so far has found that this approach is
quite versatile, to mention a few of the findings:
TETEs can be defined to incorporate the concept of
required linking between incident and target entities.
For example for a fire in a room to spread to
equipment, such equipment must be Located in that
room. This type of condition can be included as an
attribute of the TETE
The transfer of a Threat is not deterministic, it is
required that some estimate of the probability of the
threat transfer be included as an attribute of the
If wild card TETEs is defined then the probability of
a particular threat transfer can be made dependent
upon some attribute of the target entity.
TETEs effectively represent security expertise, and are
therefore developed by the security officer. Suppose
however a large organisation has adopted this model for
its various branches, each with its own security database.
Given the common means of classification it is clear that
TETEs representing common security knowledge can be
developed by head office (say) and imported into branch
3.3 Security Design
Security documentation should also play a role in the
design of security systems, following the identification of
significant areas of risk.
The threat trees provide an insight into the path from an
intrinsic threat to an undesirable business impact. Having
identified such a path, as a priority security task to be
addressed, the role of the security design is to reduce the
probability associated with this path. Consider the threat
tree illustrated in Fig 4, it can be considered that
additional security is required to reduce the probability of
the three transfer Threat /Entity 1 ? Threat/ Entity 1.2 and
/ or Threat /Entity 1.2 ? Threat/ Entity 1.2.1.
The security measures, physical or procedural, to be
deployed clearly depend upon the nature of the TETE
linking the nodes of the tree. In effect, the role of the
countermeasure is to reduce the attribute of the TETE
describing the probability of the threat transfer.
The threat trees can thus play an important role in security
design, inasmuch as they help to define the type and
placement of the countermeasures.
The RDR included the concept of Threat Countermeasure
Diagrams (TCD) to describe that aspect of security design
concerned with the effectiveness of countermeasures, and
such diagrams have been incorporated into this model.
The TCD is based upon the concept that countermeasures
are themselves subject to threats that can either result in
the countermeasure being bypassed or rendered
ineffective. Threats to countermeasures are countered by
additional countermeasures. For example, it is well
known that firewalls are vulnerable to illicit
reconfiguration, and must be protected by effective access
control. Threat Countermeasure Diagrams are trees of
countermeasures designed to ensure the security
effectiveness of the root countermeasure.
TCDs like TETEs represent security expertise, since they
demonstrate the effective deployment of countermeasures.
Hence given acceptance of the classification scheme they
can be imported into databases. Interestingly the use of
object identifier wild cards seems to allow a TCD to be
customized to its environment. Hence it would appear to
be possible for a generic imported TCD to take account of
The information security environment has undergone
radical changes over the last decade. Organisations are
now highly dependent upon the effective operation of
their information systems, and these systems have become
complex and highly vulnerable to external influences.
Hence effective information security risk management is
now a vital component of an organisation?s viability.
Such risk management has also been impacted by the
escalation of system complexity coupled with the
increasing vulnerability and strategic importance of the
information systems. Effective risk management, in turn
relies upon reliable and timely risk assessments.
THREAT / ENTITY 1
THREAT / ENTITY 1.1 THREAT / ENTITY 1.2
THREAT / ENTITY 1.2.1
Fig 4. Threat Tree
The cost of risk assessment exercises increases sharply
with system complexity, and a major component of such
costs lies in the collection of the wide range of security
relevant data. Moreover in an security officers now must
provide convincing evidence of the actions taken by the
organization, to identify and address the threats to their
This paper has emphasized the importance of effective
security documentation in the above scenario. It has also
noted the lack of tools and support to assist security
officers in the development of such documentation.
The paper suggests that conventional textual
documentation may be replaced by an electronic database
and supporting software. Such a database, and associated
software tools, must developed around a common
information security model and this paper describes such
It has been demonstrated that a standardised classification
of security entities, using object identifiers, facilitates the
development and implementation of such a model. The
work conducted so far has indicated how the model may
be deployed in risk assessment and security design.
Moreover the model provides an opportunity for the
importation of security expertise from vendors, advisory
A prototype model based upon Visual Basic has been
developed to test the concepts and a more comprehensive
Java based software package is currently under
development at the City University of Hong Kong.
 Kwok, L.F. (1997): A hypertext information
security model for organizations, Information
Management and Computer Security, Vol. 5
No.4, pp 138-48.
 Anderson AM, Longley D and Kwok LF (1994):
Security Modeling for Organizations, Proc. 2nd
ACM Conf on Computer and Communications
Security, Fairfax VA, pp. 241-250.
 IT Baseline Protection Manual Standard Security
 British Standards Institute (1999), BS7799: 1999
Information security management, Part 1 Code of
practice for information security management,
Specification for information security
 ISO/IEC 17799 (April 2001): Code of practice for
information security management URL:
 Kwok, L.F, Fung, P.K., and Longley, D (2001):
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Excerpt From Essay:
Total Pages: 3 Words: 954 References: 6 Citation Style: MLA Document Type: Research Paper
Essay Instructions: First read the following which discuss (1) cost measurement of business risks, (2) the relationship between risk and organizational performance, and (3) risk reporting and allocation. Reading these materials carefully should help you complete and respond to the assignment expectations adequately.
Ballou, Brian, Heitger, Dan L., and Schultz, Thomas D., (2009). Measuring the costs of responding to business risks. Management Accounting Quarterly. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from
Dai, Zhonglan, (2005). What matters more for CEO turnover: Performance or risk? Ph.D. dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States -- North Carolina. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=997887091&sid=3&Fmt=6&clientId=29440 &RQT=309&VName=PQD
Grant, John H., (2007). Advances and Challenges in Strategic Management. International Journal of Business, 12(1), 11-31. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1210832701&sid=1&Fmt=6&clientId=2944 0&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Johnson, Kevin and Swanson, Zane, (2007). Quantifying legal risk: a method for managing legal risk. Management Accounting Quarterly. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1411673301&SrchMode=1&sid=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1301589798&clientId=29440
Juras, Paul, (2007). A risk-based approach to identifying the total cost of outsourcing. Management Accounting Quarterly. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1411673311&SrchMode=1&sid=6&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1301589926
With, Elbert De and Dijkman, Aagtje, (2008). Budgeting Practices of Listed Companies in the Netherlands. Management Accounting Quarterly. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1625887761&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1305826699&clientId=29440
Epstein, M., Buhovac, A. R. 2006. Organizational Risk Reporting for Internal and External Decision Making. CMA Management. Hamilton: Nov 2006. Vol. 80, Iss. 7; pg. 26. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=32&did=1253708181&SrchMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1315213097&clientId=29440
Query, J. T. 2008. Cost of Risk Allocation Issues. Cost Management. Boston: Mar/Apr 2008. Vol. 22, Iss. 2; pg. 45. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=23&did=1466253901&SrchMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1315212952&clientId=29440
Use the readings and any other additional resources to answer this:
To what extent should risk be identified, managed, and measured in business organizations? What tools are available to assist in this task? Why should this be the domain of management accounting? Support your answers with good arguments and citations where appropriate.
Write a 3 to 4 page essay typed, double spaced, 12 pt font, News Times Roman, 1 inch Margin (all margins)
The following items will be evaluated in particular:
Analyze and evaluate the most common types of risk in most business entities.
Evaluate the risk, tools for risk measurement, and relationship between risk and management accounting.
Discuss the importance of risk management in management accounting. Include reliability and measurement issues in your discussion.
Excerpt From Essay:
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